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Environmental policyConcentration permits are regarded as an interesting policy tool for regulating emissions where, besides
absolute amounts, also local concentration is important. However, effects of governance structure, trading
system and possible policy interventions in the permits' allocation are not yet well analysed and understood.
This paper explores in how far tradable fertilisation standards can be seen as a concentration permit trading
(CPT) system which can be ﬁne-tuned for further policy intervention. Indeed fertilisation standards such as
obliged by the EU Nitrate Directive can be regarded as local nitrate emissions limits, and thus concentration
permits. Amulti-agent spatial allocation model is used to simulate the impact of deﬁning themanure problem
in terms of concentration permits rather than conventional emission permits. Impacts are simulated in terms
of environmental performance and increased reallocation costs. The model is applied on the Flemish manure
problem.+32 9 264 62 46.
der Straeten).
ll rights reserved.© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Tradable permits or quotas have become an important tool for
managing externalities and they are currently attracting an increasing
interest in OECD countries (Kampas and White, 2003). Their main
advantage is cost efﬁciency: a predeﬁned environmental target can be
achieved at minimum cost (Baumol and Oates, 1971). Assuming
perfect market conditions (this is without transaction costs), the
permits will be used by those who attribute the highest value to them
(Tietenberg, 2003), regardless of their initial allocation (Montgomery,
1972). Tradable permits are useful when the emissions under
consideration have no local impact on environment or population
(Lejano and Hirose, 2005), as is the case for greenhouse gases and
NOx. In such cases it does not matter where the pollutants are emitted
because it is only their overall concentration that has an impact on the
environment. However, when emissions have an immediate, or an
almost immediate effect, on the local environment, permit trading
does not guarantee achievement of initial emissions targets for each
local receptor. As a result of permit trading, emission hotspots can
occur (Lejano and Hirose, 2005), locally affecting environment and
population. Examples include toxins (lead, SO2,…) and noise.
Therefore, Stavins (1995) argues that, in such cases, an ambient or
concentration permit trading (CPT) system is theoretically preferable
to a regular emission permit trading (EPT). A concentration permit isdeﬁned as the granting of permission to deposit a quantity of
pollutants at a speciﬁc receptor (Ermoliev et al., 2000). Theoretically,
the market will enable a cost-efﬁcient outcome (Montgomery, 1972).
However, some authors believe that in practice, such systems
generate high transaction costs and cannot achieve cost-effectiveness
(Tietenberg, 1995). This complexity is seen as a major reason why,
based on literature knowledge, no policies based on CPT have been
developed so far.
However, simulations of well-described problems exist and may
show the potential for CPTs, or facilitate the analysis of CPT effects. An
example of such a well-described problem is that of manure and
manure policy interventions, in regions with a high concentration of
animal production. Basically, manure policies attempt to solve
manure surplus problems at particular locations, by spreading the
impact over wider areas, whilst safeguarding the carrying capacity of
the environment at each location. The manure problem has been
extensively described (e.g. Helming and Reinhard, 2009, Lacroix et al.,
2005, Lauwers et al., 1998, Oenema et al., 2007, Wossink and
Gardebroeck, 2006), making it a good case to increase our under-
standing of the opportunities for CPT.
The objective of this paper is to compare the CPT systemwith an EPT
system, using the empirical case of the manure problem as a model for
CPT. The Flemish policy case is used as an illustration.With amulti-actor
spatial programmingmodel (earlier described byVander Straeten et al.,
2010), the Flemish case is simulated with an EPT as well as a CPT
regulation. This allows identifying speciﬁc market characteristics for
tradable concentration rights, e.g. spread of environmental pressure,
private costs for the emitters. The case research also makes possible
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market.
The paper is organised as follows. The paper starts by describing
the possibilities and the theoretical advantages of both EPT and CPT.
This section also explains the analogy of the manure problem with a
CPT system. The use of Flemish manure policy, with its idiosyncrasies,
is also speciﬁed. Section 3 describes themodel used to analyse the EPT
and CPT regulations. This makes explicit the spatial aspects of permit
prices and illustrates how the costs and beneﬁts from the trade in
permits can be calculated. In the results section EPT and CPT systems
are compared using ﬁve criteria: environmental effectiveness,
economic efﬁciency, administrative costs, dynamic effects, wider
economic effects and soft effects. Section 4 discusses the results and
provides conclusions.
2. The Flemish Manure Policy as a CPT Case
2.1. Comparing CPT with EPT
Environmental policies to manage limited resources, or to prevent
damage from pollution, can intervene at different levels of the
pollution process. Regulation of input use is very common in
environmental policy design. This approach is appropriate when the
damage from pollution relates solely to the level of input use. Even
more precise are policies regulating emissions, instead of inputs or
outputs. However, in many cases, the damage from pollution depends
more on the spatial concentration of pollutants than on total
emissions. The location of emissions therefore matters, especially
where they lead directly to spatial differences in environmental state
and impact. Looking in more detail at the damage from pollution,
exposure and the risk proﬁle of those exposed to it, can also play a role
in determining the pollution impact (Stavins, 1995).
Concentration permits are policy measures that account for these
spatial differences. They are deﬁned as limits on the emission per unit
of output, per unit of efﬂuent or per receptor (Bruneau, 2005,
Ermoliev et al., 2000). They can enter a trading system, but the use of
the right remains linked to the efﬂuent or receptor side. Ambient or
concentration permit trading systems are terms which are used
interchangeably in the literature. In the remainder of the paper, we
will use the term concentration permit trading (CPT).
Stavins (1995) argues that, theoretically, optimal environmental
policy should intervene at the highest detail level of the pollution
impact cycle. Pollution management should therefore take into
account concentrations, exposure and the risk proﬁle of those
exposed as the main indicators of environmental damage. The
advantage of controlling risk and exposure, rather than input use or
total emissions is twofold. First, the threshold of exposure cannot be
guaranteed when only total emissions are controlled. Second, more
opportunities emerge for adapting the production process when
exposure rather than total emissions is minimised. Exposure mini-
misation can be achieved by changes at the production location
(including input or output-based measures), as well as by minimising
emissions or a combination of both, whilst emission minimisation is
only restricted to minimising the emissions themselves. In other
words, with CPT one can reduce damages even if total emission is not
reduced, simply by relocating the activities. Main disadvantage is the
higher cost to spread the total emission in order to respect the local
thresholds.
Despite the theoretical advantages of CPT systems compared to
EPT, until now the use of CPT systems has not been widely described
in the literature. However, the system can offer signiﬁcant advantages
compared to EPT, particularly for air pollution, as it can prevent the
concentration of pollutants (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1987). The
main reason for not using CPT, however, is the likely increase in public
and private transaction costs associated with policy intervention at a
greater level of detail in the pollution process (Stavins, 1995; Vatn,1998). Vatn (1998) argues that it is generally more costly to
undertake regulation on dispersed emissions, rather than on well-
demarcated inputs into the economy. Therefore, Vatn (1998) states
that an input-oriented environmental regime is potentially more
efﬁcient than an emission-oriented one, if transaction costs are taken
into account.
Where the spatial dimension of resource use or emissions does
matter, the EPT system is sometimes combined with spatial
limitations to permit trading (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1987;
Tietenberg, 2003). The RECLAIM programme in the U.S., for example,
makes a distinction between two areas (coastal and inland). Because
the predominant wind direction from the coast is inland, EPTs can
only be transferred within the same area or from the coast to the
inland area. EPT transfers from the inland area to the coast are
prohibited (Harrison, 2003). Similar trade rules have been introduced
in the Dutch Nutrient Quota System. Phosphate production is
regulated using animal-based production rights. Each farm was
allowed to produce 125 kg P2O5 per hectare of land. Farmers
producing more manure, in terms of phosphate, need additional
manure production rights. These rights are tradable between farmers.
Also here, distinction is made between two regions: a manure surplus
(average phosphate production higher than 125 kg per hectare) and a
manure deﬁcit (with phosphate production below 125 kg/ha) region.
Trading of rights is permitted within each region and from the surplus
region to the deﬁcit region (Wossink, 2003).
Choosing between policy instruments needs objective evaluation
criteria. In our CPT–EPT comparison, we will use the set of objective
criteria, as suggested by Tietenberg and Johnstone (2004): environ-
mental effectiveness, economic efﬁciency, administrative costs,
dynamic effects, wider economic effects and soft effects. Environ-
mental effectiveness measures the extent to which the policy meets
the environmental objective, whilst the economic efﬁciency indicates
whether or not this is achieved at the minimum cost. Administration
costs allow the checking of whether transaction costs (cost to set-up,
implement and control a policy) remain at an acceptable level. The
dynamic effect of an environmental policy instrument is the extent to
which the policy generates incentives for technological innovation.
Changes in competitiveness and distributional effects are the wider
economic criteria and, ﬁnally, the soft effects refer to the attitude
and the behavioural response driven by the environmental policy
instruments.
For such a broad evaluation, operational tools for policy analysis
are necessary. In the current paper, the model of Van der Straeten
et al. (2010) is used to quantitatively simulate emissions, allocation of
these emissions and resulting costs, thus directly providing insight
into some of the OECD evaluation criteria (measures of environmental
effectiveness and economic efﬁciency). But also indirectly a discussion
is possible on administrative costs, dynamic effects, wider economic
effects and soft effects.
To show the potential of the modelling framework, it has
been applied to the case of Flemish manure policy, for which data
are available to enable a quantitative analysis of a currently applied
CPT.
2.2. Description of the Flemish Manure Problem and Policy as a CPT Case
The manure problem relates to the over-production of animal
manure, and thus the risk of excessive nitrogen and phosphate
emissions at given loci. The problem has been identiﬁed in many
countries or regions, including the Netherlands and Flanders. The
Dutch Nutrient Quota System is given above as an example of a policy
to control the externalities of intensive livestock production. Flanders,
a region within Belgium and adjacent to the Netherlands, faces a
similar problem with animal concentration and potentially localised
manure emissions. The Flemish manure policy is, together with the
Dutch manure policy, probably the most detailed policy in the world
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agricultural sources.
The Flemish manure policy limits the amount of nutrients (N and
P2O5) from animal manure emissions using fertilisation standards. Van
der Straeten et al. (2010) describe these standards of organic nitrogen
use as Nutrient Allocation Rights (NARs). One NAR gives the farmer the
right to emit 1 kg of organic nitrogen. NARs are allocated to individual
farms based on their land use. As an example, each farm receives 170
NARs for organic nitrogen per hectare of arable land. The emitted
nutrients must be used on that speciﬁc hectare of land, which makes
NARs an example of concentration permits. NARs have also been
categorised as tradable emission rights (Lauwers et al., 2003), because
the policy allows transactions of NARs between farmers. Contrary to
other examples of emission permits, the right to emit is locally ﬁxed and
the emission can be traded (Buysse et al., 2008). Therefore, theNARs are
similar to, and can be described as, an example of a CPT system.
Flemish manure policy prescribes how individual farms have to
deal with their emissions (manure). The emission produced per farm
is calculated based on the number of animals per animal type, feeding
technique and housing type. All manure produced must either be
emitted within the available concentration rights (NARs) or the farm
has to opt for emission abatement, which involvesmanure processing.
The initial allocation of concentration rights is based on land use, but
the right to emit an amount of manure can be traded between farms.
As such, the farms have three allocation choices. First, they can use
their produced emissions (manure) within their own concentration
permits. Second, the farms can transport their emissions to other
farms with unused concentration permits, which mean permit
trading. Third, the farm has the option to engage in emission
processing. Manure processing or treatment is used as a comprehen-
sive term for all technologies which remove or recover nutrients from
manure (Flotats et al., 2008). As a result, Flemish manure policy has
created amarket for manure (Van der Straeten et al., 2010), which can
now be seen as an example of the demand and supply of
concentration permits. Manure processing is seen as an end-of-pipe
abatement solution for pollution. In this paper, we do not consider a
possible fourth option— i.e. a reduction in animal production or other
changes in the activities of the farm — as this would require a more
complex simulation and optimisation model and goes beyond our
research objective to explore the manure problem as a case of
concentration permit trading.
3. Method
3.1. The NAR Market Model
Geographically, the concentration permits (NARs) are evenly
spread, but the production leading to emissions is regionally
concentrated. This spatial difference between demand and supply of
NARs can be simulated using a spatial price equilibrium (SPE) model.
The SPE model computes the supply prices, demand prices and
emission trade ﬂows, satisfying the equilibrium condition. The
equilibrium condition states that, when trade between two regions
occurs, the demand price of a NAR equals the supply price plus the
transportation cost. Trade does not occur when the demand price is
lower than the supply price plus transportation costs. Transportation
of the emissions or reallocation of the emission sources, and their
costs, are the main characteristics that differentiate concentration
permits from traditional emission permits. Both transportation and its
costs are captured in the SPE model. The individual demand and
supply behaviour is simulated for each agent by a mathematical
programming model that assumes cost minimising behaviour when
emissions are allocated.
The combination of the individual mathematical programming
models for each agent and the overall SPEmodel gives a Mathematical
Programming Multi-Agent Simulation model (MP-MAS), as devel-oped and described in more detail in Van der Straeten et al. (2010).
The model uses data from each individual farm, with regard to its
location, production and NARs, and calculates a farm-speciﬁc supply
or demand of NARs. As the MP-MAS allocation model is able to
differentiate costs relating to each allocation option at farm level and
is able to endogenously simulate market prices for the NARs, it will be
applied in this paper for the CPT–EPT comparison.
In order to make the analogy between the manure problem and
the CPT system explicit, we start from the equation in Stavins (1995)
in which the quantity of traded permits (tn) by actor n is deﬁned as:
tn = jμn−rn−q0n j ð1Þ
with un the unconstrained emission, rn the emission reduction or
abatement and q0n the initial allocated permits. Translated to the
manure case, this equation becomes:
TPn = jNPn−NTn−NAR0n j ð2Þ
in which TPn stands for the traded permits per year by farmer n, NPn
the nitrogen production per farmer per year, NTn the volume of
treated (processed) nitrogen per year and NAR0n the initial NAR
allocation per farmer per year.
Eq. (2) is the driving factor to permit exchange and formalised
within the NAR market model as described by Van der Straeten et al.
(2010).
The following equations represent the model in algebraic notation
where variables are indicated by Greek symbols whilst parameters are
indicated with Latin symbols.
Minimise Σn
h
Σa abatecosta 4 μna + Σa disposalcosta 4 σna
+ Σmaτnma distancenm 4 transportcosta
i ð3Þ
s.t.
NARn ≥ Σa excretiona 4 animalsna−μna−Σmaτnma + Σmaτmna ρn½  ð4Þ
with n, m  N, where N denotes the farm population and a=(1,…,A)
indexes the livestock category.
The model uses abatecosta, disposalcostsa, distancenm, transport-
costa, NARn, excretiona, animalsna as given parameters.
abatecosta is the abatement cost for manure per unit of nitrogen
for a given livestock category (euro/kg N).
disposalcosta is the disposal cost or spreading cost for manure per
unit of nitrogen for livestock category a (euro/kg N).
distancenm is the distance between two ﬁrms n and m (km).
transportcosta is the unit transport costs for manure of a livestock
category a (euro/km/kg N).
NARn is the available nutrient allocation rights at ﬁrm n in a
speciﬁc year (kg N).
excretiona is the excretion coefﬁcient to calculate the amount of
manure based on the present animals (kg N/present animal).
animalsna is the number of present animals per year.
μna, σna, τnma are positive variables and ρn is the dual variable of
constraint (4).
μna is the amount of emission abatement per year (kg N).
σna is the amount of disposed manure per year (kg N).
τnma is the amount of traded NARs per year, between farm n
(buyer) and m (seller) (kg N).
ρna the dual variable of constraint (4) and indicates the price of
NARs of farm n per year (euro/kg N).
The model minimises all direct costs related to satisfying the
concentrationpermit constraintper year: the sumof emissionabatement
(Σa abatecosta*μna), manure disposition (Σa disposalcosta*σna), and
emission reallocation (Σma τnma distancenm*transportcosta). The model
focus is on the decision related to managing emissions not on changing
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present animals is not variable in the model.
Optimising the model simultaneously for all farms makes it
possible to simulate the price of NARs endogenously. The price of
NAR is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and is represented in the model by the dual
variable of the ﬁrm level NAR constraint (4). The ﬁrm speciﬁc price
reﬂects the spatial diversity in supply and demand of NARs. The
exchange of NARs causes a transfer of income from net buyers of NARs
to net sellers of NARs. The net costs per farm can be calculated by
using the objective function (3) plus the costs or income from the
exchange of NARs (Σma τnma*ρm−Σma τmna*ρn) as follows:




The transportation (Σn Σma τnma *distancenm * transportcosta),
manure disposal costs (Σa spreadcosta*σna) and abatement costs
(Σn Σa abatecosta*μna) are additional costs at sector level, whilst the
concentration permit costs (Σn Σma τnma*ρm) and beneﬁts (Σn Σma
τmna*ρn) are the result of redistribution within the agricultural sector.
The net cost can be negative for the net sellers of concentration
permits, which means that farms with more NARs than needed for
manure supply have a net income from the manure policies. The
calculation of the price for NARs and the resulting redistribution
across locations and between farmers is explained in the next
subsection.
3.2. Price of NARs
Under perfect market conditions and EPT assumptions, a uniform
market price can be identiﬁed (Baumol and Oates, 1971). In CPT,
however, the unequal distribution of emissions and NARs, and the
distance between suppliers and demanders become important in
terms of price setting. Stavins (1994, 1995) assigns transportation
costs the same characteristics as other transaction costs, because of
their similar inﬂuence on market equilibrium. In the case of the NAR
market, the buyer of the permits bears the transportation costs. This
results in a downward shift in the demand curve (Fig. 1). Similar to
transaction costs (Stavins, 1995), transportation costs lead to a
difference in the price received by a seller of the rights (PS) and the
price paid by the demander (PD). The traded volume decreases from
Qm to QT. However, the shift in the demand curve (Fig. 1) is not the
same for the whole range of exchanged NARs, because the
transportation costs for emissions vary.
Each animal type — as a combination of species, age and feeding
system — produces manure with its own characteristics (e.g. nutrientFig. 1. Graphical representation of the market of concentration rights and the effect of
transport costs on the market equilibrium.content and dry matter content). The model in the current paper
considers four different manure types, each with speciﬁc nitrogen
content, resulting in a different transportation cost per kg of nitrogen.
This results in a discontinuous shift in the demand curve for NARs. A
farm will transport manure by manure category in order of the
associated transportation cost. The cheapest type of manure results in
a small downward shift in the curve, the type with the highest
transportation cost will result in a larger downward shift.
The shift in the demand curve also depends on the spatial
dimension of the NAR market. NARs located far from the emission
source bear higher transportation costs. The resulting demand curve
shifts more to the left, so the observed price of the NARs is lower, at a
lower traded volume. In regions with high emission concentrations,
competition for concentration rights is high. Farms in regions with
highly concentrated sources of emission have to choose between
buying expensive local NARs or reallocating their emissions to a
region with lower prices, whilst bearing higher transportation costs.
This speciﬁc characteristic of the NARs results in spatial differences in
market prices, which has also been demonstrated for manure
emission rights (Van der Straeten et al., 2010; Van der Straeten and
Buysse, 2009).
3.3. Speciﬁcation of Costs and Beneﬁts from Trade of NARs
The price of the NARs (PNAR) generates a reallocation of revenues
within a sector, if the actual use is different from the initial allocation,
i.e. when ∑n|TPn|≠0. In the case of manure emission rights in
Flanders, the distribution of the rights is based on land use, whilst the
emission is based on animal production. Correlation between land use
and animal production is strong for cattle farms, but much smaller for
specialised animal farms, which have a signiﬁcant NAR shortage, and
specialised arable farms, which have a signiﬁcant NAR surplus.
The distributional effect between agents is one of the OECD
objective test criteria (see Section 2.1: wider effects). Evaluation of
this criterion requires an in-depth analysis of costs and beneﬁts
from the NAR trade. Although the emission source, manure, is
rather heterogeneous and results in a discontinuous demand curve
for NARs, the concentration emission from manure can be expressed
homogeneously as kg N/ha. The costs for the NAR buyer are then
the costs for the bought permit (PS QT) plus the transportation
costs as shown in Fig. 2. The costs of transporting the emission is,
however, not equal to (PD−PS) QT because our calculation uses the
marginal transportation cost as a proxy for the average transportation
cost per right. Fig. 2 shows that the marginal transportation cost is
generally higher than the average transportation cost if transportation
costs are not homogeneous for all the emissions. If more than one type
of manure is transported, the marginal costs reﬂect the costs of theFig. 2. Transportation costs in the manure market.
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cost will be lower because also less expensive manure types are
transported.
Graphically, only the shaded part in Fig. 2 is the actual transpor-
tation cost and not the full area a, b, Ps, Pd.
3.4. Data
For our simulations, we used data for 2008, obtained from the
Flemish Land Agency (FLA or Vlaamse Landmaatschappij, VLM),
which is a public body controllingmanure exchange between farmers.
The dataset contains the complete farm population and offers data
about crops, manure production, NARs and the manure allocation
behaviour for each Flemish farm. In total 36,073 farms are included in
the model. These farms have a total area of 644,000 ha. With 23,444
farms holding animals, this results in a total nitrogen production of
121 million kg and a phosphate production of 58 million kg. More
than half of the nitrogen is produced by cattle andmore than one third
by pigs. Poultry is the third most important nitrogen producer (8% of
total nitrogen production). A quarter of the Flemish farms are manure
surplus farms, i.e. they produce more manure than they can spread on
their own land (with respect to NARs).
4. Results
The NAR system, issued from the Flemish manure policy, and to
be seen as a case for CPT system, is compared with a hypothetical
and simpler, tradable emission permit (EPT) system. Under the CPT
system, the farm's emissions are spatially limited by the imposed
maximum concentration rights. The simpler system of tradable
permits (EPT) gives the farms more degrees of freedom, because
they can produce the same quantity of emissions without fully
tackling the problem of emission concentrations. In fact, in an
EPT system, farms would face limits at considerably higher concen-
tration levels. In the case of manure, the amount of manure per ha,
under an EPT system, will only be determined by the agronomical
maximum, beyondwhich production, or utility, would be reduced. For
the sake of our simulations, this agronomical maximum is set at
500 kg N/ha on grassland, 400 kg N/ha for most other crops and
200 kg N/ha for crops that tolerate only a limited amount of nitrogen,
such as onions, peas and beans. These maxima are realistic and
comparable to amounts applied in the past, before the manure
regulation was imposed.
Under the EPT policy, farmers have to obtain enough rights to
dispose all the manure produced on their farms. However, the main
difference with CPT is that the right is not attached to a speciﬁc parcel.
A farmer can obtain the right for emitting the manure, up to the
agronomical maximum, on his own parcels. This makes this type of
policy less costly than a policy with more severe local concentration
limits. To be able to focus on the effect of introducing the CPT, the total
available NARs is assumed equal under EPT as under CPT. At micro
level it is the agronomical maxima which deﬁne the manure use,
whilst at macro level this manure use is deﬁned by the imposed
equality of available NARs between both scenarios.Fig. 3. Difference in average nitrogen use per hectare of land p4.1. Economic Efﬁciency
For the analysis of economic efﬁciency, only the sum of the private
costs borne by farmers is taken into account. As pointed out earlier, any
actual concentrations above the concentration limit must have a social
cost, beyond the private cost. However, we have no quantiﬁed damage
function from manure concentrations. Hence, the ‘net costs’ are the
private costs of regulation, and not the full ‘social cost’ of the regulation.
The environmental impact is discussed in the next subsection.
The net private costs for all manure emissions in Flanders, under
the EPT system, are estimated to be 84.89 million Euros (on an annual
basis). More than half of these costs are disposal costs (56%), 43% are
processing costs and the remaining 1% are transport costs. The more
restrictive CPT system increases the net costs to 92.64 million Euros
for all manure emissions. The difference of 7.75 million Euros can be
seen as a consequence of the higher transportation costs of the
emissions under a system based on concentration permits (NARs).
The beneﬁts of manure use, in terms of improved crop yield or
increased substitution for organic fertilisers, are not taken into
account here, but yields are expected to be higher for the CPT system,
because the manure is better distributed over more plots.
The results conﬁrm the statement of Stavins (1995) that emission
control based on concentration permits might increase total costs. The
costs in our case are still a lower estimation because we have not taken
transaction costs, i.e. costs for information, negotiation or control into
account. Also the public control costs are not considered. The actual
manure emission is monitored through soil samples and sporadic by
helicopter controls. Transportation activities over longer distances are
controlled by GPS. The cost of GPS markers is imposed on the private
farms and is included in the 7.75 million Euro estimation. The cost of
helicopter control is met from public funds and is not included. The
above mentioned fertilisation value of manure is speciﬁc to our case,
and cannot be extrapolated for a CPT–EPT comparison.
Drawing a distinction between sellers of NARs (i.e. farms
producing less nitrogen than their available NARs) and buyers of
NARs (i.e. farms producingmore nitrogen than the available NARs)we
can see that the increase in the net private costs from a CPT system
compared with an EPT system is mainly increased costs of buying
permits (from 67 to 94 million Euros or +40.3%). Sellers experience a
decrease in net private costs using a CPT instead of an EPT system from
17 to−1 million Euros due to the increased market value of the sold
NARs. The sellers of NARs gain additional beneﬁts from the improved
fertilisation of their crops, although this is not taken into account in
the model.
4.2. Environmental Effectiveness
The overall environmental objective is to prevent the occurrence
of excessive nitrogen leaching. Althoughwe don't dispose of a damage
function, we can state that consequences of the CPT system and the
simpler EPT system are also quite different. The FLA administrative
database shows that the CPT policy type has successfully induced a
reallocation of manure disposal. Fig. 3 shows the difference in the
average municipal nitrogen use per hectare of farmland between theer municipality between CPT and EPT in 2008 (kg N/ha).
Table 1






Cattle 65.08 57.76 7.32 0 65.08
Pig 33.09 10.95 22.14 10.89 43.98
Poultry 0 0 0 9.94 9.94
Other animals 2.30 1.76 0.54 0 2.30
Total 100.47 70.47 30.00 20.83 121.30
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use in case of CPT.
The CPT system, since it imposes a lower emission concentration,
forces manure to be moved to other locations. Our MP-MAS
simulations shows that, under the EPT system, based on the identiﬁed
land area of 644,000 ha, 422,000 ha (66%) would receive a lower or
equal manure emission, whilst 222,000 ha (34%) would receive a
higher manure emission compared to the CPT system. The higher
manure emission under EPT is observed in the areas that would
export under CPT, the lower manure emission in areas with net
imports of manure. On 82,000 ha of land (12.7%) the maximum EU
nitrogen concentration for vulnerable areas (i.e. 170 kg N from
manure/ha) is exceeded more than twice (i.e. more than 340 kg N
from manure) under an EPT system.
4.3. Wider Economic Effects: Competitiveness and Distribution
With the EPT system, only agronomical limits constrain farmer's
use of manure. To ensure an equal total emission in Flanders for both
scenarios we imposed at macro level that emission abatement should
be the same under both policies. Simulation of the EPT scenario then
shows that practically no manure transport occur, meaning that all
disposed manure, originates from the own farm. Simulation of a CPT
system (Table 1) shows that farmers become either a supplier or a
purchaser of permits, and that permits are indeed traded between
farms in these groups.
In 2008, slightly more than 100 million NARs were grandfathered
to farmers in Flanders. This allows for the disposal of more than 80% of
the total emissions produced (121 million kg N). From this total
nitrogen use of 100.5 million kg, almost 30% is spread with traded
NARs. Although the NAR market is an important tool enabling the
farmer tomanagemanure emissions andmeet legal requirements, the
supply of NARs is not sufﬁcient to allow all of the manure to be used
on the land. In total, 20.83 million kg N still has to be processed or
exported to other countries.
Due to the heterogeneous nitrogen content of manure, allocation
behaviour for the four manure types signiﬁcantly differs. The manure
type with the highest nitrogen content will be chosen for the most
expensive allocation option. This explains why the processing option
is mainly met by using poultry and pork manure. Most of the traded
NARs are used for the disposal of pig manure: 74% of the overall NAR
trade. Cattle manure is mostly used with a farm's own NARs (89% of
the total production) because of the higher transportation costsFig. 4. Difference in net costs per municipalitwhere NARs are exchanged, and the fact that cattle farmers usually
possess more land per livestock unit than pig or poultry farmers.
The CPT system also leads to regional differences in NAR prices,
given the local demand for permits and differential transportation
costs. These regional differences are speciﬁc to CPT because the permit
prices of an EPTwith a perfect market should be uniform. The regional
difference will of course also have an impact on the regional
distributional effects of the policy. Fig. 4 gives evidence for this by
showing the differences in total costs for each municipality.
Not only regional distribution effects, also a redistribution between
farm types is observed. Especially farms specialised in pig production
experience larger costs under CPT (+32% net costs). Specialised poultry
and cattle producers experience less net costs (respectively −8% and
−2%). The crop producers experience the largest decrease in net costs
(from +70 000 Euro to−4.6 million Euro).
Whilst managing the regional dispersal of emissions, the CPT
system also provides the policy makers with additional opportunities
to protect more vulnerable regions. In the Flemish case, this option is
used to further reduce manure concentrations in regions with high
values for wildlife or for drinking water resources. This policy option
has distributional consequences because farms located in vulnerable
zones are affected more than other farms. A voluntary buy-out
scheme for permits might alleviate this inequality. This has, for
example, been done in the Dutch phosphate EPT system (CPB, 2000),
or in the Flemish CPT case. Farms located in vulnerable regions have
the option to participate in agri-environmental schemes. In return for
a payment, they voluntarily agree to dispose of less manure on their
land than the maximum allowed concentration. This system allows
the government to buy out NARs in regions with high vulnerability.
Although this option exists in Flanders, it is not simulated in our
model.
4.4. Dynamic and Soft Effects
CPT gives more incentives for innovative management. A CPT
policy introduces additional limits and costs. The effect is threefold.
First, as transportation costs are expensive, farmers might reduce
manure production by altering stock density or feed composition.
Second, manure surplus farmers will try to transport surplus manure
as cheap as possible. As long as transportation costs are sufﬁciently
low, NARs can be bought and the manure can be transported.
Reducing transportation costs can be achieved by increasing the
nutrient content of manure. Third, manure processing becomes an
attractive alternative when transportation costs increase, whilst
under EPT this would not be considered. All options lead to innovation
and the search for efﬁcient techniques.
4.5. Administrative Costs
Administrative and monitoring costs under CPT increase because
both the amount of manure and the location of disposal have to be
registered. With EPT, administrative costs involve monitoring trade in
NARs and nutrients between farms. With CPT, additional tasks include
monitoring the location ofmanure disposal at parcel level. Enforcementy between CPT and EPT in 2008 (Euro).
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helicopters.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
Montgomery (1972) has already demonstrated that, theoretically, a
competitive market within a tradable concentration permits system
would result in the minimisation of total emission control costs, whilst
attaining the predetermined environmental standard at each receptor.
Stavins (1995) reﬁned this result by incorporating transaction costs in
the analysis. He shows that transaction costs may inﬂuence market
equilibrium in the case of emission permits and that they may impede
the implementation of tradable concentration permit systems, despite
their theoretical advantages in terms of pollution control.
This paper uses the manure regulation policy in Flanders as a real
world example of the application of tradable concentration permits
and the use of a multi-agent model allows transportation costs to be
considered in the analysis. Using an administrative database of 36,000
ﬁrms active in the trade of manure concentration permits, the costs
and effectiveness of the CPT policy are compared to a simpler EPT
policy alternative. The simulations show that the CPT system
outperforms the traditional tradable emission permit system in
terms of meeting environmental standards. However, this improved
environmental performance comes at the expense of increased
manure transportation costs for those farms producing excess
emissions. In the Flemish manure case, these extra costs amount to
7.7 million Euros which represents a cost of 400 Euros for each farm
with excess emissions.
In the case of manure, the emission is transportable to the location
of the concentration permits. More farms get the opportunity to
participate in the market for concentration permits, which then
creates greater competition. The regional submarkets experience
different prices, which are linked to the emission transportation costs.
This allows for the generalisation of CPT policies. One important
conclusion is that the transportation cost of the emission may be an
important reason for the system not often being used as a pollution
control option. In the case of air or water toxins, transportation costs
are very high. This means that rights can only be transferred to ﬁrms
within a speciﬁc area, resulting in the existence of several small
submarkets (Atkinson and Tietenberg, 1987). Another conclusion is
that any complete environmental assessment of a CPT system has to
include the pollution from transportation since this can be signiﬁcant.
The distribution of concentration permits in the case of Flemish
manure is based on agricultural land. Concentration permits are
assigned to each plot based on its size, location and vulnerability to
nitrate leaching. The administration costs of assigning concentration
permits are currently limited, because today farms are already subject
to administrative input for other purposes, such as direct payments
from the Common Agricultural Policy. The main additional adminis-
trative costs are associated with the exchange of NARs between farms.
The different opportunities for transfer of concentration rights are
controversial (Tietenberg, 2003). Those who are in favour of the free
exchange of permits argue that any restriction reduces the efﬁciency
of the system (Tietenberg, 2003). Yet, others argue that intervention
in the free market of rights is justiﬁable to prevent socially
unacceptable outcomes, such as the loss of community interests,
environmental degradation and the concentration of rights. Further
research may focus on these issues. The conclusion is that a tradable
concentration permit system is an adequate policy alternative in a
scenario with the following features: a low transportation cost for the
emission, transparent distribution of the concentration rights and a
market for concentration rights involving many participants.
This research can therefore be seen as putting a theoretical concept
into operation, whilst beneﬁtting from existing empirical work, not in
the least the modelling that has been done. An approach has been
used that combines mathematical programming models of individualfarms with a spatial equilibrium model. This proves to have the
potential, not only to simulate trade in permits, but to analyse
additional policy interventions.
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